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COUNCIL AND COMMISSION
SIXTEENTH REPORT
ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE MONET AR Y COMMITTEE
FOREWORD
The purpose of this report is to give a brief account of the activities of the Monetary
Committee during 1974.
During this year the Committee held 15 sessions and the working parties drawn from
its own members or set up at its initiative met on many occasions.
At its session of 10 July 1974 the Committee elected its officers. It elected as Chairman
Prof. C. Oort, Treasurer-General in the Netherlands Ministry of Finance, and as Vice-
Chairmen, Dr. O. Emminger, Vice-President of the Deutsche Bundesbank and Mr C. de
Strycker, Vice-Governor of the Banque Nationale de Belgique. Mr J. G. Littler, of
M. Treasury was elected Chairman of the Committee of Alternate Members. In
accordance with the Council Decision of 30 April 1972 aligning the dates of renewal
of the terms of office of the members of certain committees, the terms of office of the
new officers will expire on 31 December 1975. A list of members as at 31 December
1974 is annexed.
The report was adopted as at 31 December 1974.
INTRODUCTION
1. In 1974, world business activity lost a good deal
of momentum; this trend was accompanied by a
further acceleration of inflation and 
balance-of-payments disequilibria of record
proportions. The heavy swing in the terms of trade
resulting from the increase in the prices of raw
materials and especially from the quadrupling of
crude oil prices from November 1973 onwards 
contributed to these developments. The disequilibria
and inflationary tendencies increased in gravity most
of all in those countries which already had run into
difficulties before the oil crisis. The new pattern of
international payments relations combined with
domestic economic difficulties, particularly in deficit
countries, posed a serious thr,eat to the free trade and
payments arrangements developed since the war.
2. The new economic and financial situation also
hampered the process of integration in the Com-
munity. Consequently the Community authorities
gave priority to reaching agreement on practical
action to help Member States in difficulty and to
safeguard the degree of integration already achievedNo C 174/2 , Official Journal of the European Communities 31. 7. 75
rather than attempting further progress towards
economic and monetary union along the lines
mapped out in previous years. The rapid reduction of
the extreme payments disequilibria of certain member
countries and the restoration of the stability of the
value of money are among the most important
pr.econditions governing the revival of the integration
process in the Community, for without them present
strains in the Community cannot be dispelled.
3. This report is divided into four parts. The first
chapter reviews international monetary events in
1974, and the second chapter gives an account of
joint" Community action in the monetary field
including progress towards the establishment of
economic and monetary union. The third chapter is
devoted' to a review of the economic and monetary
trends in the Community and the fourth summarizes
the activities of the Committee s Working Parties.
CHAPTER I
THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKETS
4. The Monetary Committee followed closely
developmel1ts in the foreign exchange markets. In
1974 international monetary relations were hampered
by formidable payments disequilibria. Although
internal economic factors were partly to blame in
some countries, the position was aggravated by the
, sudden jump in crude oil prices in late 1973.
5. The currencies of most industrialized countries
continued to float throughout the year; the
modifications in exchange rate relationships between
the major currencies mainly reflected the economic
and monetary trends in the various countries. For
much of the year, national and international interest
rate policies w,ere of particular importance for many
currencies: interest rate disparities proved 
important factor in capital movements, the potential
size of which grew appreciably as a result of the
colossal surpluses of the oil-producing countries.
Another factor of disturbance which was of some
imp_9rtance for a period around the late summer was
uncertainty about the position of some banks and the
particular difficulties experienced by some of them as
consequence of over-extension in the foreign
exchange markets. This was a relatively short period
of unease which was over by the ,end of the year.
6. The trend in the rate of the US dollar against
the currencies within the Community 'snake
illustrates the changes which oq::urred in exchange
rate relationships. At the beginning of the year the
improvement in the position of the dollar, which had
been observed in the last few weeks of 1973, became
more marked despite the fact that, during that
period several central banks in industrialized
countries sold dollars in currency support operations.
During the second half of January, the dollar rate
was being quoted at about 8  above its nominal
parity against the currencies within the Community
snake. This was a result of the belief that the higher
oil prices would damage the US economy less than
the economies of most other industrialized countries.
7. But in the first weeks of 1974, most
industrialized countries, in an attempt to facilitate the
financing of existing or expected payments deficits
began to relax the measures they had taken to
control inward capital movements during the period
of the monetary crisis. Most countries introduced
measures to facilitate or encourage capital inflows;
furthermore, the restrictions QI1 capital outflows were
tightened in countries facing particularly serious
payments problems. These measures were supported
by a high interest rate policy, constituting an
important element in the fight against inflation
particularly in the European countries.
8. In the United States, the liberalization of capital
movements, and in particular the abolition of all
restrictions on the export of capital combined with
an interest-rate pattern favouring investment abroad
led to heavy outflows of capital from the end of
January 1974 onwards. As a result, there has since
been a depreciation in the dollar on the exchanges.
After reaching its nominal parity against the
currencies within the Community snake on 21
February, it continued to drift downwards; in
mid-May the depreciation reached about 10 % against
its nominal parity.
9. Ther,eafter, the scarcity of liquidity on the US
money market which was the result of, a more
restrictive monetary policy, and the prospect of a
greater inflow of petro-dollars led to an improvement
in the situation, with the dollar, despite fluctuations
gradually strengthening until, in mid-September, it
had almost returned to its nominal parity against the
currencies within the Community snake.31. 7. 75 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 174/3
10. After September the dollar rate swung
downwards again, mainly owing to the marked
decline in short-term interest rates in the United
States compared with other countries and to the
disappointing trend in the trade balance and the
unfavourable business situation in the United States.
After steadily weakening in the fourth quarter, the
dollar had, at the end of the year, almost returned to
its lowest 1974 level, namely that recorded 
mid-May; its depreciation against the Community
snake currencies was in the neighbourhood of 10 %.
11. On 19 January 1974, after consulting the other
member countries and the Commission, the French
Government decided to discontinue its participation
in the Community exchange scheme and temporarily
to allow the franc to float independently. The
purpose of this step was to forestall speculation and
to protect the reserves. At the same time, the French
authorities declared their intention to ensure orderly
working of the exchange market. The Monetary
Committee held a consultation on the French
decision. Immediately after this decision, which was
underpinned by measures to curb capital outflows
and to encourage capital inflows, the value ' of the
franc on the exchanges dropped by some 5 % against
the currencies remaining in the snake. In mid-May,
the franc touched its lowest level, a drop of almost
14 % as against the Community snake, thereafter
staging a gradual recovery; by the end of the year, it
was being quoted at 5 to 6  below the snake
currenCies.
12. Otherwise, the Community snake operated
relatively smoothly; the rates of the participating
countries' currencies remained for most of  the time
comfortably within the authorized margin of 2.25 %
and generally speaking, little intervention in
Community currencies was needed. However, it must
be pointed out that US dollar interventions by central
banks of the snake and the DM interventions by the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, which essentially
aimed at moderating fluctuations in the dollar, were
also helpful for the stability of the system. There
were only two periods of strain: once between the
end of March and the last two weeks in May, when
the Deutschemark was practically always at the
snake s upper limit, with the Belgian franc and the
Danish krone taking turns at the other extreme.
Faced with this situation, which was largely
attributable to speculative capital movements, the
Bundesbank was, in accordance with the agreed
rules, obliged to support the weakest currencies by
taking in about DM 4000 million of foreign
currenCIes.
13. The second occasion on which the
Community s exchange arrangements were strained
was between the end of July and the beginning of
October, when the Belgian franc and the Dutch
guilder were persistently at the snake s upper limit
while the Deutschemark was quoted for most of the
time at its lower limit. The weakness of the
Deutschemark, which, in view of the generally
favourable balance of payments situation in
Germany, might have seemed surprising, was
attributable mainly to interest rate differentials and to
the unease caused on international exchange markets
by the collapse of a German bank. In order to
stabilize exchange rates, the Bundesbank had to sell
foreign exchange worth about DM 3 500 million
during that period. The reversal of exchange-rate and
intervention trends in the snake during the course of
the year demonstrated the effectiveness of the
Community exchange-rate system.
14. In 1974 the currencies of the countries
participating in the snake appreciated, in some cases
quite considerably, against almost all other
currencies: from 1 January to the end of the year the
extent of this appreciation approached 6 % against
the French franc, 15 % against the US dollar and the
pound sterling and 25 % against the lira and the yen.
CHAPTER II
ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION AND OTHER JOINT COMMUNITY ACTION
15. Balance of payments disequilibria, which were
already in existence in the Community due to
divergent economic trends and policies in the
member countries, were rendered much more severe
by the energy crisis and presented the Community
with exceptionally difficult problems in 1974. The
strained situation harboured the danger that
individual countries might be tempted to seekNo C 174/4 Official Journal  of  the European Communities 31. 7. 75
solution  to  their difficulties through unilateral
measures. The main task  of  the Community
institutions was, therefore to  forestall the possibility
of  protectionist actions or actions distorting
competition and  to  promote joint action  to  help
Member States in difficulty. Progress towards
economic and monetary union along the lines
mapped out in 1973 remained in suspense, but the
Community was able  to  achieve agreement on a
number  of  practical measures which effectively
strengthened its solidarity.
16. After January, on-Iy five Community countries,
(together with Norway and Sweden) still adhered 
the arrangements concluded on 24 April 1972 on the
narrowing  of  intra-Community margins for  the
United Kingdom and Ireland had already left the
snake on 23 June 1972, Italy had followed suit on 
February 1973, and France on 19 January 1974.
17. At a meeting on 21 January 1974 the
Ministers  of  Finance and the Governors  of  the
Central Banks  of  the countries remaining in the
snake, (BLEU, Denmark Germany and the
Netherlands) confirmed their resolve  to  maintain the
existing relationships between their currencies within
the framework  of  the 'Basle Agreement', one
objective being to facilitate a swift return  to  the
, Community snake by the other Member States. They
also reached agreement on the principles and
procedures  for  the closer coordination 
arrangements  for  interv,ention on the exchanges, 
foreign exchange control regulations and  of  monetary
and credit policies, with the aim  of  ensuring the
smooth working  of  the Community exchange
scheme.
18. In January 1974, the Commission proposed
that the Member States should state their firm
intention to refrain 'from any competitive
depreciation  of  their currencies and from any
restriction on trade , and hold consultations at
Community level on exchange-rate trends, interest
rate policy, the use  of  the international capital
markets and the utilization  of  reserves. This was
agreed by Council on 18 February 1974. In addition
the Council stated that the EEC would endeavour 
ensure 'that the whole  of  the international
community adopts, in the field  of  money and trade
policies which would assure stable and orderly
relations . At the same meeting, the Council formally
approved various legal instruments for the
strengthening of economic and monetary union, on
which agreement in principle had already been
reached on 17 December 1973 (see Fifteenth annual
report on the activities of the Monetary Committee
OJ  No  C 123 , 14.  10.  1974, p. 5). Thus, it renewed in
more  systematic, and sometimes stronger form, the
arrangements already in existence by taking decisions
on: the attainment  of  a high degree  of  convergence 
the economic policies  of  Member States, stability,
growth and full employment in the Community, and
the creation  of  an Economic Policy Committee; it
also invited the member central banks  to  increase the
quotas in the short-term monetary support arrange-
ments.
19. In 1974, the Monetary Committee also dealt
with problems arising out  of  the Italian situation. In
February, this country was negotiating with the
International Monetary Fund for a stand-by credit
agreement. In accordance with the Council Decision
of  8 May 1964, consultations were held in the
Monetary Committee since Italy proposed  to  have
recourse  to  resources which can be mobilized within
the framework  of  international agreements
However, it was only on  10  April that the IMF
opened a credit line  to  Italy  of  000  million SDR. In
the meantime, on 18 March the Banca d'Italia, with
the agreement  of  the Committee or Governors  of  the
Central Banks, drew the equivalent  of  1 562500  000
units  of  account under the short-term monetary
support facility which had been made available on a
stand-by basis from June 1973. In order  to  have a
better understanding  of  the Italian situation, the
Monetary Committee created a Working Party under
the chairmanship  of  Mr de Strycker. This Working
Party held discussions with the Italian authorities in
March and drew up a report. The conclusions  of  this
report were contained in the Monetary Committee
Opinion  to  the Council and the Commission  of 
April.
20.  On 29 April the Italian Government
announced that it was introducing emergency
measures under Article  109 of  the EEC Treaty. The
key measure was a requirement  to  lodge with the
Banca d'Italia for  six-month period a
non-interest-bearing cash deposit totalling  50 
the value of specific visible imports. This was mainly
intended  to  scale down domestic liquidity and
indirectly  to  facilitate the restoration  of  balance 
payments equilibrium. The Commission immediately
examined Italy s situation, and on 6 May 1974
addressed a recommendation  to  the Italian
Government indicating those re-equilibrating
measures which in the Commission s opinion were
essential and urgent. On 8 May, it published a
Decision authorizing Italy to take these emergency
measures within the meaning  of  Article  108  (3).
21. On  July 1974, the Italian Government
adopted a comprehensive set  of  stabilization
measures relating  to  taxation and public serVICe
charges; these measur, with a few mInor31. 7. 75 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 174/5
amendments were approved by the Italian
Parliament in August. Meanwhile the Monetary
Committee Working Party chaired by Mr de Strycker
held a further series of consultations with the Italian
authorities. The short-term monetary support was
renewed twice for a period of three months on 18
June and 18 September. On the basis of one of the
Working Party s reports, the Monetary Committee
prepared an Opinion in No_vember (see Annex I)
which led to a recommendation by the Commission
and on 18 November 1974 the Council approved a
Directive on the granting of medium-term financial
assistance to the Italian Republic. The assistance
totalled 1 159 200 000 units of account, and is to be
paid back in four equal instalments in 1978. The
interest rate  7.5625 %  is an average between
the corresponding market financing cost and IMF
financing on comparable maturity terms. The United
Kingdom, which for balance of payments reasons
was unable to take part in the financing of the
medium-term assistance
, .
continued to accord to the
Banca d'Italia a renewable three-month credit in the
amount that it had formerly made available in the
short-term support operation. In accordance with
Article 9 of the Directive, the Commission, in
collaboration with the Monetary Committee, will see
that the conditions of economic policy to which the
assistance is linked are properly observed.
22. In addition to these Community arrangements
the Banca d'Italia obtained a loan of $ 2 000 million
from the Deutsche Bundesbank in return for pledging
a part of its gold reserves, valued at market-related
prices, as collateral.
23. One of the major preoccupations of the
Committee during the whole year has been the
monetary and financial implications of the energy
crisis, in particular the recycling of the oil-producing 
countries expected surpluses. In February, the
Committee examined the proposal that the
Community should undertake a joint borrowing
operation on the international capital markets with
the double objective of recycling oil funds and
assisting Member States with balance of payments
difficulties. In accordance with a request received
from the Council at its session of 6 June, at its
meeting of 10 and 11 July, it adopted an Opinion on
the problems which would be involv,ed in floating a
Community loan. In addition, it set up a Working
Party of both treasury and central bank
representatives, on the basis of whose studies it
finally adopted an Opinion to the Council and
Commission on 10 October (see Annex II). On the
basis of this work, the Council considered the
question of Community loans at several sessions and
on 21 October 1974 approved a basic Regulation and
on 19 December 1974 approved a Regulation
implementing the first Regulation.
24. This provided the Community with 
instrument enabling it to help towards financing oil
deficits. Under the basic Regulation it is the
Community which will raise the loan, in one or more
operations, either directly from third countries and
financial institutions or on the capital markets.
Including interest,. the total amount of the loans may
not exceed $ 3 000 mjllion and their average term
must be at least five years. With the proceeds, the
Community will grant Member States loans to which
will be attached economic policy conditions fixed by
the Council in each case.
25. The implementing Regulation lays down the
procedure to be followed in the event of a Member
State which has received a loan from the Community
being unable to raise the necessary foreign exchange
to make a payment. In that event, the other Member
States undertake to provide finance to enable the
Community to continue the servicing and
amortization of the loan. Each Member State s share
in the refinancing will be determined in . line with its
short-term monetary support quota. Member States
which are themselves in balance of payments
difficulties may be exempted from this refinancing
subject to the condition that no contributing country
will be obliged to provide proportionately more than
twice its quota. Countries required to meet the
guarantee acquire a claim on the Community. The
loan amounts are placed at the disposal of the central
bank of the borrowing country, since these loans are
intended solely for the financing of balance-of-
payments deficits.
26. The Committee was also involved in arrIVIng
at a Community position on other recycling
proposals made in international fora. In particular
the IMF oil facility for 1974 and later for 1975 as
well as the OECD Financial Support Fund were
discussed in the Committee on several occasions.
27. The Monetary Committee gave considerable
attention during the year to the problem of gold and
after a detailed discussion of the problem, the
Committee adopted a report to the Council and the
Commission at its meeting of 4 and 5 April. This
report, together with that of the Committee of
Governors, formed the basis for the understanding
reached at the informal conference of finance
ministers at Zeist on 22 and 23 April 1974. The
substance of this understanding was presented by the
Chairman of the Monetary Committee to the
Committee of Twenty of the IMF at its meeting in
June 1974 (see Annex III). The Monetary Committee
continued to keep the gold problem under review 
part of its preparations for meetings at the
international level.No C 174/6 Official Journal of the European Communities 31. 7. 75
28. The Monetary Committee also frequently
discussed other international monetary problems. On
a number of these it was able to arrive at a common
position which the Community usefully presented in
the IMF, Committee of Twenty (Committee for the
~eform of the international monetary system and
associated questions), and the Group of Ten. The
principal questions dealt with concerned the value
and interest rate of the SDR, the r,evision of IMF
quotas, amendments to the IMF Articles of Agreement
and to the General Arrangements to Borrow (GAB),
the setting up of the Interim Committee of the Gover-
nors of the Fund , and the particular interests of
developing countries.
29. The Monetary Committee discussed and
presented written reports on various monetary
questions linked to the achievement of economic and
monetary union, such as the Community exchange
rate system, pooling of reserves and the unit of
account. At the Council session of 16 September, the
President of Council had presented a memorandum
on European monetary revival in which 
highlighted four areas as being suitable for studying
the possibility of immediate further progress. These
were:
CHAPTER III
floating of a Community loan,
the units of account used by the Community,
modification of the Community exchange rate
system
coordinated action on the Euro-markets.
30. In accordance with the Council request to
begin work as soon as possible on the latter three
items, the Monetary Committee submitted an initial
opinion on the unit of account to be used for the
European Development Fund and then on the general
question of the European unit of account. The work
on this problem is still continuing. It also submitted
an Opinion on joint floating of Community curren-
cies, and began work on the problem of coordinated
action on the Euro-markets.
31. The Committee held consultations and
prepared Opinions on the exchange rates used for the
conversion of national currencies into units of
account for the purpose of the common agricultural
policy. These consultations principally concerned the
Italian lira, the pound sterling and the Irish pound.
ECONOMIC AND MONETARY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE COMMUNITY
32. The Committee held its regular examinations
of monetary and financial developments in Member
States, with particular emphasis on the monetary
policy pursued. During the year it held such
examinations of France the United Kingdom
Germany and the Netherlands.
33. In 1974, largely because of higher oil prices
and  at least in the early part of the year  higher
prices of the other main raw materials, the general
economic trend in the industrialized countries
changed direction: the long period of vigorous
growth in the world economy came to an end. World
business trends became very uneven  in most
countries growth declined and in some countries the
GNP actually contracted. The volume 
international trade, which had expanded by 15 % in
1973, increased by less than 5  in 1974, not
increasing at all in the fourth quarter. In terms of
dollar value, however, growth in 1974 matched the
rate for 1973 (37 %), which reflects inflationary
tendencies in many parts of the world. The
Community s main international trading partne
were hard hit: in the United States and Japan, real
gross national product declined sharply. The other
industrialized countries were affected to differing
degrees, but the pace of growth slackened everywhere
in the course of the year.
34. The Community countries were not sheltered
from the changed world economic climate. For 1974
the growth of real gross domestic product fell 
half, from 5.5 % to slightly more than 2 % for the
Community as a whole. This overall figure was the
net result of an appreciable increase in the first half
of the year and a pronounced decline in the second;
by the end of the year industrial production was at
best marking time, when not actually falling. In 1974
as in 1973, export demand was the most buoyant
growth factor, or to be more exact, the least sluggish.
After increasing by 12 % in 1973, the volume of
exports of the Community as a whole rose by only
about 9 % in 1974, and even this figure owed much
to an unexpectedly high increase (nearly 50 %) in the31. 7. 75 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 174/7
volume of imports of the oil-producing countries.
Private consumers
' ,
expenditure (volume) in the
Community as a whole rose by a mere 1.1 % in
1974, compared with 4.6 % in 1973, despite the rapid
increase in incomes in 1974; gross fixed capital
formation fell in real terms by 1.3 % in 1974
(+ 4'8 % in 1973). In most of the member countries
these two demand components deteriorated almost
without interruption throughout the year. The
increase in public current expenditure in real terms
also slowed d9wn in 1974but more moderately (3 %
as against 3,6 % in 1973).
35. Employment was inevitably affected by the
decline in the level of economic activity. During 1974
those countries which previously had suffered very
little unemployment also had to cope with this
problem. By the end of the year more than 3 % of
the labour force in the Community were out of work.
In addition, hours worked were reduced in many
industries, so that short-time working became
widespread. The hardest hit by the energy crisis were
industries whose prospects were suddenly clouded by
the disappearance of a cheap energy source, 'the main
sufferers being the motor vehicle industry and its
suppliers. But in all sectors of activity, the sudden
heavy swing in the terms of trade and the climate of
increased uncertainty helped to foster expectations of
a recession and to bring out cautious attitudes.
36. Inflation was gathering momentum, at the end
of 1973 and this trend was confirmed in 1974; the
upward price movement reached very high levels in
almost all the Community countries under the
combined effects of the rise in oil prices, the
depreciation of certain currencies, the slowdown in
productivity gains and, above all, the sharp increase
in wage costs. The tendency for excessive growth in
money supply which accompanied these phenomena
was not reversed in all Member States by sufficiently
restrictive monetary and budgetary policies. But the
pace of inflation differed considerably from country
to country in the Community. The rise in the cost of
living index was lowest in Germany (5,9 
%); 
rates
were higher in the Netherlands (10.9 %),
Luxembourg (11.3 %), France  (15'2  %), Denmark
15.3  %) and Belgium  (15'7  %), but not as high as in
Ireland (17 %), the United Kingdom (19,1 %) and
Italy (19,2 %). At the end of the year, however, there
was evidence in most, member countries that strain
was eaSIng.
37. The most obvious effect of the leap in the
prices of petroleum products was a sharp
deterioration in the current accounts of the
industrialized countrjes. In the United States, the
current account, which had achieved a modest
surplus in 1973  ($500  million), accumulated a
deficit of $1 300 million in 1974 (1); in Japan, the
deficit increased considerably from $100 million to
$4500  million between 1973 and 1974. The
deterioration was even more marked for the
Community as a whole, which showed a deficit of
some $13 000 million in 1974, compared with a
small surplus in 1973 of $800 million. Beneath this
overall deterioration, however trends differed
considerably within the Community, the countries
with current-account surpluses before the oil crisis
managing to maintain or even increase their surpluses
and those with deficits or balanced positions being
the hardest hit, as shown in the following table.
(l) These figures and all the others given in this paragraph
are OECD estimates.
Current balance of the Community countries (in $ 1 million)
BLEU Denmark Germany France Ireland Italy Netherlands
United
Kingdom
1973 1.4 0,5 4,4 0,7 0.2 2.4 1.8 2.9
1974 0.5 1.0 9,4 6'0 0.6 7.9 1.8 9.1
Source:  OECD.
38. By the end of 1973, the authorities in most'
member countries faced with accelerating inflation
had increasingly tightened up economic policy
measures. This . pattern was maintained and even
reinforced in the first half of 1974; but in the second
half, the decline in activity and the sharp rise in
unemployment prompted most member countries to
adopt measures which, if not really reflationary, were
designed at least to provide selective support for
economic activity and in particular investment
although only Germany had as yet had any real
success in combating inflation. Interest rates rose toNo C 174/8 Official Journal of the European Communities 31. 7. 
record levels in almost all countries. None the less
accelerating inflation meant that in all the countries
except Germany the remuneration of savings failed to
offset the fall in the value of money. Together with
the fact that short-term rates were frequently higher
than long-term rates, this helps to explain why
investors in these countries were reluctant to place
their funds on a long-term basis, and the relatively
poor performance of the capital markets.
CHAPTER IV
WORKING PARTIES OF THE MONETARY COMMITTEE
39. The Working Party on Securities Markets
continued to examine developments in the capital
markets of Member States and in the international
capital market and discussed capital market policies.
It presented a report on its activities, the conclusions
of which were approved by the Monetary Committee
(see Annex IV).
40. Having received a report in October 1973 (see
fifteenth annual report) from the Working Party on
Short- Term Capital Mov.ements, in fulfilment of its
original terms of reference, the Committee defined
the area of future activities of this Working Party. At
its meeting of 4 and  April, it approved new terms
of reference which instructed the Working Party in
the first stage to exchange and examine mutual
information on national exchange control measures,
in the second stage to reach a consensus on what
constitutes a minimum armoury of common
instruments and on how the use of such instruments
might be concerted and in the third stage to examine
the possibility (at the Community level) of a
differential application of these instruments as
between intra- and extra-Community capital
mov.ements. As a first step in the fulfilment of these
terms of reference, the Working Party submitted an
interim report in December which was approved by
the Monetary Committee (see Annex V).
41. At its meeting of 4 and  February, the
Monetary Committe~ adopted terms of reference for
the Working Party on Harmonization of Monetary
Policy Instruments set up jointly with the Committee
of Governors in accord~nce with the resolution of the
Council and the representatives of the Governments
of the Member States of 22 March 1971 on the
achievement by stages of economic and monetary
union. After the terms of reference were also
approved by the Committee of Governors, the
Working Party commenced work in the middle of the
year..31. 7.  Official Journal of the European Communities No C 174/9
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ANNEX 
REPORT TO THE COUNCIL AND THE COMMISSION
(Grant of medium-term financial assistance to Italy)
I. INTRODUCTION
1. Pursuant to the Agreement establishing a system of
short-term monetary support between the central banks
of the Member States of the EEC, signed on 9 February
1970, and amended on  January 1973, short-term
monetary support was granted to the Bank of Italy on 28
June 1973 for an amount of 1562.5 million units of
account (US $1 884,9 million). At the same time, as in the
case of the mobilization by the Bank of Italy of the
support facility on 18 March 1974, the Monetary
Committee proceeded to examine the economic and
monetary situation in Italy, in accordance with the terms
of Article VII of the Agreement establishing a system of
monetary support. The conclusions reached by the
Monetary Committee were given in a report dated 24 July
1973 (Doc. II/453/73) and in the Opinion tOf 5 April 1974
(Doc.  II/194/74) presented to the Council and the
Commission. In view of the fact that the term for which
the short-term monetary support was granted expired on
18 September 1974, the Monetary Committee further
examined the situation in Italy and adopted, on 
September 1974, the text of an Opinion to be submitted
to the Council and the Commission (Doc. II/496/74). In
this document, the Committee expresses the view  inter
alia  that the Community should continue to contribute to
Italy s financing needs and that such action is a matter of
urgency.
2. On the basis of this Opinion, the Council, having
noted the decision of the Committee of Governors of the
Central Banks to renew the short-term monetary support
granted to Italy for three months, requested, at its meeting
on 16 September 1974, that the Commission, together
with the Monetary Committee and the Committee of
Governors of Central Banks, should draw up concrete
proposals regarding medium-term financial assistance to
Italy.
3. At its meeting on 6 and 7 November 1974, the
Monetary Committee carried out a thorough examination
of the situation in Italy on the basis of preliminary work
by the  ad hoc  Group 'Italy , which met on several
occasions in Rome and Brussels under the chairmanship
of Mr de Strycker. The conclusions reached by the
Monetary Committee are given in the present report.
II. THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN ITALY AND
THE CURRENT OUTLOOK
4. After expanding strongly last year and in the first
half of 1974, economic activity is at present tending to
weaken. Whilst exports are still expanding very briskly,
the trend of domestic demand, especially for investment
is rather hesitant. In seasonally adjusted terms, industrial
production actually declined in the period July to August;
in relation to the corresponding level for 1973, no more
than a slight increase was recorded (not quite 1 % against
18.6 and 8,7 % respectively for the first and second
quarters of 1974). The upward movement of prices
however, continued at an extremely rapid pace, with
consumer prices in September exceeding by 24.6 % and
wholesale prices by 43.7 % the levels reached a year
earlier.
5. The weakening of domestic demand, together with
the simultaneous expansion of exports, seems to have
resulted in an immediate improvement in the current
balance of payments position. This latter was slightly in
deficit in July-August (Lit 47000 million) as against a
deficit of Lit 2 027 000 million in the first quarter and Lit
2 183 000 million in the second quarter. Furthermore, for
the first time in recent years, capital movements showed
an upward trend despite the fact that no further loans had
been floated on the international financial markets by
State-controlled enterprises. Partly as  result of a 
2000 million credit (Lit 1 321 000 million) granted to Italy
by the Bundesbank, gold and foreign exchange reserves
held by the Italian monetary authorities, which amounted
to Lit 2 793000 million in June, rose to Lit 4521000
million in September.
6. For the current year the Italian authorities forecast
an increase in the GNP of 4 to 4.5 % by volume and
20 % in money terms. Consumer prices are expected to
rise by 20 %. The deficit on account of goods and services
which amounted to Lit 1551000 million in 1973, will rise
to Lit 5 850000 million in 1974 (see paragraphs 8 and 9).
7. In the event that the current economic weakness
continues during the first quarter of next year, the
year-to-year growth of the GNP in volume will not
exceed 1.5 % in 1975 (1). A rise of 16 % in consumer
prices is forecast, and the total wage bill is expected to
rise by the same order of magnitude. Fixed investment at
constant prices is expected actually to decline by 1.5 %
whilst the other components of domestic demand are
likely to expand to only a slight extent. Conversely,
exports of goods and services may reasonably be expected
to grow rapidly  (by  8 % at constant prices). This being
the case, the deficit on account of goods and services at
constant prices should decline to an appreciable extent
such that a deficit of about Lit 3 400 000 million seems a
plausible estimate for 1975 (corresponding to about 3 %
of GNP in money terms for 1975, against 6 % in 1974).
(I) According to Italian experts, the disappointing trend of growth
results from constraints imposed by the balance of payments deficit
and the high level of Italy s indebtedness.No C 174/12 Official Journal of the European Communities 31. 7. 75
The balance of payments
8. Forecasts for the current balance of payments in
1975 (deficit of Lit 3 250000 million) are based essentially
on the assumption of an increase of 6 to 7 % in the
volume of world trade. This forecast allows for a slight
increase in the share of Italian exports in world trade, as a
result of the depreciation of the lira since February 1973
In addition, it seems probable that the weakness of
domestic demand will induce Italian businessmen to
increase their efforts to penetrate foreign markets.
9. As regards the trade balance (fob figures) in 1975,
the Italian authorities expect the oil deficit to stabilize at
the level reached in 1974 (Lit 4700000 million or $7200
million at an exchange rate of 1 US $ = Lit 655) (1
This forecast assumes that no change will occur in the
quantities and prices of oil products imported in relation
to the average for 1974. On the other hand, the non-oil
trade balance, still substantially in deficit in 1974 (by Lit
1 600000 million or $2400 million), should show a
surplus of some Lit 700000 million next year ($1100
million). Furthermore, a surplus of the same order of
magnitude is predicted for the balance on account of
services and current transfers.
10. As regards capital movements, only the yearly
capital repayments relating to the off-setting loans (2) can
be predicted with certainty; they will amount to $1 000
million in 1975. In round figures, the balance on account
:)f current transactions and servicing the external debt will
amount to about $6 000 million next year. Any net
capital movements in categories other than those
mentioned would, of course, modify this total.
11. As of the end of October, the means available to
finance this deficit were as follows:
gold stocks of about $3 500 million valued at a price
of $42.22 per ounce (3
foreign exchange reserves, including SDR' , of about
$3 400 million.
$4 000 million of ' swap' credits.
- IMF standby credits of $400 million.
Public finance
12. Treasury receipts on account of central government
budget transactions amounted, in the period January to
August 1974, to Lit 11 656000 million and expenditure to
) For the purposes of this report, the oil deficit is defined as the
difference between the value of total imports and exports of
petroleum products. For comparison, this deficit was Lit 800 000
million in 1973.
) These are loans contracted since June 1972 on international
financial markets by certain State-controlled enterprises. The
proceeds of these loans were frozen almost in their entirety in the
Bank of Italy.
) Of this stOck about 20 % has been given as collateral for a loan
of $2 000 million from the Deutsche Bundesbank.
Lit 15 133 000 million; levels for the previous year were
therefore exceeded by 22.1 and 11.1 % respectively. As a
result of the higher rate of growth of receipts, the budget
deficit was limited to Lit 3 477 000 million (Lit 4 068 000
million in the period January to August 1973). However
as a result of other treasury transactions (administration
;)f the deposits and loans bank  Cassa Depositi e Prestiti
and autonomous institutions) the deficit on treasury
account was higher than in the previous year (Lit
5921000 million against Lit 4292 000 million: it was
financed almost entirely by monetary means. According to
estimates by the Italian authorities, the treasury deficit
will amount to around Lit 8400000 million in 1974. This
figure is higher than that forecast in September by Lit
400 000 million, due to certain expenses  espeCially in
relation to the State enterprises ENEL and IRI  being
brought forward from 1975 to 1974.
13. The balance on account of current transactions by
all public authorities has been in deficit since 1971. This
deficit amounted to Lit 702 000 million in 1971, Lit
2 '076000 million in 1972 and Lit 3 463 000 million in
1973. For the current year it could amount to about Lit
.3 000 000 millio~. The deficit for the State (Lit 534 000
million in 1971, Lit 951 000 million in 1972 and Lit
2486000 million in 1973) will decline to about Lit
1 650000 million in 1974. This decline is mainly due to
direct taxation reforms and to the series of fiscal measures
introduced in July.
The expansion of credit
14. For the period 1 April 1974 to 31 March 1975, the
(talian authorities have committed themselves to confine
the overall expansion of credits to the economy to the
total of Lit 22400000 million fixed last March during the
negotiations of the stand-by credit granted by the IMF.
The overall expansion of credit includes the financing of
the treasury deficit (excluding assistance to financial
intermediaries), credits granted by Italian investment
banks and special financial institutions (4) together with
issues of bonds by enterprises and public authorities other
than the treasury. Increases in the capital of
State-controlled enterprises or issues of shares are not
included in this definition.
15. The effective increase in credit during the first five
months of the period concerned (April to August 1974)
was, on the whole, maintained within the limits laid down
in the annual target (for the period April 1974 to March
1975) i.e. Lit 22 400 000 million. The same applies to
treasury financing which in accordance with
commitments entered into with the IMF, was not 
exceed Lit 8 600 000 million for this period taken as a
whole. Credits granted to other public authorities
(including the social security organizations) and to
enterprises in the period April to August 1974 followed a
trend corresponding more or less to the difference (Lit
) These institutions grant both medium- and long-term credit; they
obtain finance by issuing bonds.31. 7.  Official Journal of the European Communities No C 174/13
13 800 000 million) between the total volume of credit and
total treasury financing. This 'latter figure represents an
increase of about 17 %, as against 20 % in 1973.
16. The overall expansion of credit, (see Annex 1 for
detailed figures), will not exceed Lit 24700 000 million in
the period 1 April 1975 to 31 March 1976 (1). Taking into
account the reduction in liquidity which would arise from
such a balance of payments deficit as forecast, this ceiling
incorporates an increase in the monetary base of the order
of 16.1 % over 1974, whilst the rate of increase 1974 on
1973 should be 16.3 %.
This expansion of credit will allow for the following to be
covered:
Treasury borrowing requirements of Lit 8 000 000
million for 1975.
The borrowing requirements of other public
authorities and enterprises of Lit 16700 000 million.
This borrowing, taking account of internal financial
resources of enterprises and the other sources of
finance described in Annex 1 should permit investment
of about Lit 25 000 000 million to be undertaken. 
should be noted that these forecasts include a
particularly low growth rate in the financial assets of
enterprises, being only 7 to 8  between 1973 and
1975.
III. GUIDELINES FOR ECONOMIC POLICY
17. The Monetary Committee believes that Italy
balance of payments problems call for action in depth
with a view to restructuring the Italian economy. It
considers that immediate measures should be taken to
reduce the 1975 deficit substantially, whilst longer-term
measures should quickly be implemented with a view to
eliminating the external disequilibrium completely and
repaying any debts contracted.
18. The Italian Government proposes to adopt an
economic policy designed to achieve a surplus of at least
$1000 million on account of the non-oil items of the
trade balance in 1975.
Immediate measures
19. As regards public finance, the Italian Government
should make a special effort to achieve an improvement in
the situation during the coming years. In this respect, the
deficit on treasury transactions, which will amount to
about Lit 8 400 000 million in 1974, will have to 
red1.1ced to Lit 8 000 000 million in 1975 (2
) Taking account of the forecast rate of inflation, the increase in
total credit outstanding (+ 17.8 %), will be practicahy zero, in real
terms, on one year before.
) These figures do not include finance granted to financial inter-
mediaries (amounting to Lit 100 000 million in 1974 and Lit
400000 million in 1975), or the operations for consolidating certain
local authority debts (Lit 144 000 million for the eight months to
August 1974).
20. The Committee considers that the rate of growth of
public expenditure should be limited to 16 % in 1975.
This rate, which corresponds to that agreed by the Italian
Government, implies a zero increase in real terms. The
budget forecasts adopted by Parliament (appropriations
basis) exceeded this figure and particular attention must
therefore be paid to their implementation in terms of
actual receipts and expenditure. To this end, cuts may be
necessary in non-productive current expenditure and in
oem-priority sectors. Furthermore, the Government should
act jointly with the other public authorities to limit the
latters' expenditure in  1975 by an amount corresponding
to that indicated for central-government expenditure.
However, in the opinion of the Monetary Committee, a
reduction in the budget deficit can only be obtained in the
short term by a further increase in receipts.
21. As regards credit policy, the Monetary Committee
reaffirms its opinion of 11 September 1974, to the effect
that the increase in the total volume of credit granted to
public authorities and enterprises should not exceed Lit
22400 000 million during the 12 months to 31 March
1975. Between 1 April 1975 and 31 March 1976, the
increase should not exceed Lit 24 700 000 million.
Treasury financing should be conducted in such a way
that the resulting monetary creation is compatible with an
expansion of credit which is sound enough to ensure that
financing is non-inflationary in the medium term.
22. Before the end of 1975, new economIC policy
guidelines will be fixed for 1976.
Medium-term measures
23. One of the fundamental medium-term problems is
to achieve an improvement in the state of public finances.
The total budget deficit is of the order of 5 to 6 % of
GNP. In particular the margin between current
expenditure and current receipts is a little over 3 % of
GNP. The Italian authorities should undertake measures
some of them immediately, with a view to its complete
elimination within a period of five years. Furthermore
during this period, monetary financing of treasury
borrowing requirements should be progressively and
substantially reduced.
24. On the expenditure side, it would be desirable if
the authorities could reduce the rate of growth
particularly on account of the semi-public institutions, in
accordance with the Draft Law No 1718 currently before
Parliament.
25. In transferring tasks from the central administration
to the regions, care should be taken that this operation
does not involve duplication of work resulting in an
unjustifiable increase in expenditure.No C 174/14 Official Journal of the European Communities 31. 7. 75
26. As regards receipts, the fiscal and parafiscal share in
total national income in Italy is significantly below the
Community average due to the relatively low receipts from
direct taxes. Measures should be introduced immediately
to improve the relative share of direct taxation: in this
respect, it is a matter of vital necessity that the struggle
against tax evasion should be intensified.
27. The. efforts already being made to strengthen the
infrastructure of the Italian economy  especially as
regards administrative organization should be
intensified. In particular, administrative procedures, which
at present seem highly complex besides differing greatly
from one department to another, should be simplified;
measures to facilitate the mobility of officials between the
various departments within the administration should be
introduced, whilst at the same time certain tasks could be
decentralized as between the central government and the
regional authorities. This should make possible a stricter
control of the number of personnel employed in public
serVIce.
28. To improve the balance of payments position in the
medium-term, the Italian authorities should strive to
reduce consumption of petroleum products in domestic
use. On the other hand, in accordance with Community
provisions, measures designed to promote the growth 
agricultural production should be introduced. The Italian
authorities should ensure the earliest implementation of
the Council Directives concerning the modernization of
the structure of agricultural production (OJ No L 96 of 
April 1972).
29. It is important that the Italian authorities should
take meaures to adapt the structures of consumption and
production to the new situation arising from changes in
the international terms of trade. In order to achieve the
required changes in industrial production, it will be
particularly necessary to modernize the employment
services and accelerate the creation of vocational training
programmes for workers. Those Community instruments
already available (especially the Social Fund) could
support the efforts which the Italian authorities will
undertake in this field.
30. Measures to encourage saving and influence its
pattern are also needed. In this context, for example,
consideration might be given to the introduction of a
system of savings premiums to assist house purchase and
the creatibn of Italian investment funds.
31. Before 30 June 1975 the Italian Government will
present detailed drafts of measures for implementing the
actions described in paragraphs 23 to 30. These drafts will
be incorporated into an overall view of the situation at
the Community level.
IV. THE FINANCIAL CONDITIONS FOR
MEDIUM-TERM ASSISTANCE
32. Article 3 of the Council Decision of 22 March 1971
lays down that medium-term financial assistance shall be
granted to a Member State in difficulties or seriously
threatened with difficulties as regards their balance of
payments. The Committee believes that Italy is in the
situation envisaged by this Article and thinks that the
amount of the assistance should be the same as that of the
short-term monetary support, which was provided in
dollars, i.e. 1562 million units of acount ($1 884,9 mil-
lion).
33. The medium-term financial assistance could be
implemented as follows:
countries with existing or foreseeable difficulties as
regards their balance of payments which decline to
participate totally or in part in the operation in
accordance with the terms of Article 4 of the Council
Decision of 22 March 1971, would continue to provide
assistance to Italy, to the extent of their quota (or a
part of it) in the operation, within the framework of
the short-term monetary support with a tacit
undertaking to renew this assistance until the date of
expiry of the medium-term financial operation;
the amount to be financed in the medium-term, after
deducting the assistance being provided under
short-term arrangements, would be divided between
the, participating countries in proportion to their
respective quotas;
in the event that the short-term monetary support
could not be renewed, in whole or in part, right up to
the date of expiry of the medium-term financial
assistance, a Council Decision would have to
determine the methods of arranging the necessary
financing.
34. Article 3 (2) of the Council Decision of 22 March
1971 lays down that credits can be granted for two to five
years. However, a declaration written into the minutes of
the Council meeting specified that 'in order to ensure at
the beginning a higher degree of liquidity, it would be
advisable to limit credits to a period of two to three years
during an initial period of three years maximum following
the effective employment of the system . In view of the
fact that the payments falling due in relation to the
servicing of external debts already contracted by Italy will
be quite heavy in 1976 and 1977, the Committee considers
that it would be appropriate to envisage repayment in
instalments during 1978. In this way, the effective term of
the assistance would be approximately three-and-a-half
years.
35. As regards the currency in which the financial
assistance is expressed, the Council Decision of 22 March
1971 provides that claims and obligations shall be
expressed in terms of units of account defined in weight
of gold. The problem is to choose appropriate methods of
converting the units of account of the assistance into
currencies of payment so that the claims of the creditors
and the obligations of the debtor can be defined. To
resolve this problem the Monetary Committee considered
two possible alternatives:
(a) Under the first alternative, the medium-term financial
assistance would be provided by all the participating
countries in US dollars and repaid by the debtor
country in the same currency. The unit of account
would be converted into dollars on the basis of the
central rate of the dollar prevailing at the time the31. 7.  Official Journal of the European Communities No C  174/15
assistance is granted; at present one unit of account 
$1.20635.
(b) Under the second alternative, the medium-term
financial assistance would be provided by all the
participating countries in their respective national
currencies and repaid by the debtor country in the
same currency. The unit of account would be
converted into the different national currencies on the
basis of the central rate or market rate of these
currencies fixed for the entire term at the time the
~ssistance is granted.
36. A declaration in the minutes spe~ifies that the rate
of interest should be half-way between those current on
the open market and those applied by the IMP. Since the
IMF rate for financial assistance granted for similar terms
is 4'875, a single rate could be determined for the whole
term of the assistance on the basis of this rate and on
current rates on the Euro-dollar market for a comparable
term, if the assistance is provided in dollars. Should it be
provided in national currencies, it would be necessary to
refer to current interest rates for similar terms on the
relevant Euro-currency markets or on national markets. A
calculation of the rates applicable to various currencies
are given in Annex 2.
V. SURVEILLANCE
37. The fulfilment of the economic policy commitments
entered into by Italy and the periodic examination of the
economic situation of this country should be covered by a
regular supervisory procedure carried out jointly by the
Commission and the Monetary Committee. In particular
respect for the quantitative economic policy objectives
fixed by the Council when the medium-term financial
assistance is granted should be subject to surveillance. To
this end, the Italian authorities should communicate to the
Commission on fixed dates (for example, monthly),
certain statistical information concerning the economic
financial and monetary situation. In addition, the
Monetary Committee should carry out a thorough
examination of the progress of the situation in Italy at
regular intervals (for example, every six months).
38. To prevent a proliferation of studies and
recommendations, care should be taken to ensure that this
surveillance is carried out within the framework of
existing Community procedures. To the same end, it
would be advisable to establish the necessary contacts
with the appropriate departments of the IMF.
39. If, in the course of a study of this kind, or in the
light of information provided by the Italian authorities, it
should appear that economic trends are liable to diverge
from the objectives fixed, the Commission will so inform
the competent Community authorities. The same
procedure would apply in the event that any revision of
, the objectives was felt to be necessary.
Annex 1
Overall credit expansion in the economy
(in Lit  000 million)
1974 1975
A. Public institutions (other than those included under B)
and enterprises, including the housing sector:
1. Gross investment
2. Capital transfers received by the treasury
3. Variations in financial assets
4. Borrowing requirements (1 + 2 + 
5. Less:
- '
issue of securities
credits granted by the treasury as financial
intermediary
credits from abroad
gross saVIng
6. Balance to be financed (a)
23 550 25 000
2 700 - 2 900
1550 2300
22 400 24400
700 700
1500 1400
600 200
5600 5400
14 000 16 700
8400 8000
22 400 24 700 C. Overall credit expansion (A 6 + B)
B. Treasury, deposits and loans bank, autonomous institutions
(a) By the investment banks and special credit institutions as well as by the issue of bonds.No C 174/16 Official Journal of the European Communities 31. 7. 
Annex 2
Current interest rates in EEC member countries (except Italy), on the Euro-markets and at the
IMF for terms of three to four years
(mid-October 1974)
I. Rates on national markets (1
Germany
yield on federal treasury bills with' three to four years 
maturity
yield on medium-term federal treasury bonds
Belgium
five year SNCI and CCB treasury bills
three year SNCI and CCB treasury bills
Denmark
yield on mortgage bonds and industrial financing institute bonds
(four years to maturity)
France
- CNCA three year bonds
five year treasury bills
Ireland
yield on treasury bonds with three years to run
Luxembourg
three year bearer savings certificates
Netherlands
yield on state bonds with four years to run
United Kingdom
treasury bills with four years to run
II. Euro-market rates
Euro-dollar
four year Euro-pound
III. IMF rates
oil facility' credits (three to seven year maturities)
- '
extended fund facility' credits (four to eight year maturities)
interest rate on four year drawings (including the Commission)
10,04 to 10.33
10.40  to 10.60
9.75
9.25
13.50 to 14,50
8,60
9.02
12.10 (end June)
6.00
9.16
9.62
10,50
22.50
Progressive rate
according
to. maturity
(4 to 6,5 %)
4,875 %
) Rates on national markets' are not strictly comparable , and are often not very representative due to the low
volume of operations at the relevant maturities. Further, it should not be forgotten that these rates are
the ones most often directly or indirectly controlled.31. 7.  Official Journal of the European Communities No C 174/17
ANNEX 
OPINION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE COMMISSION
I. COMMUNITY LOANS
At its session of 16 September 1974, the Council in
dealing with the question of Community loans, considered
the report from the Chairman of the Monetary
Committee and from the Committee of Governors and
instructed the Community authorities to complete quickly
the current technical work within the guidelines laid
. down in the report submitted by the Chairman of the
Monetary Committee. The Chairman of the Council, Mr
Fourcade, also asked member governments to indicate
their official reactions to the report of the Chairman of
the Monetary  Committee.
At  its  meeting of 17 September 1974, the Monetary
Committee instructed the joint  ad hoc  group to continue
such work as was within its competence and to secure the
government reactions which the Chairman of the Council
had requested. The joint  ad hoc  group of the Monetary
Committee and the Committee of Governors met on 26
September 1974 and 7 October 1974 and considered all
the official reactions which had been received. The
Monetary Committee, at its meeting of 10 and 11 October
1974, drew up the following opinion on the basis of the
government reactions and the report received from the 
hoc  group.
II. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
OPERATION
Bearing  in  mind the need to recycle the surplus funds of
oil-producing countries, the Monetary Committee agreed
that the general characteristics of the operation should be
the following:
(a) That the Council would prefer not to engage in one
massive loan operation, but rather in one or more
loans of moderate size.
(b) The loan or loans would not take the form of public
bond issues for general subscription, but would be
placed with owners of large scale funds  principally
in oil-producing countries -. and possibly in part
with financial intermediaries. In the present situation
loans of seven to ten years maturity would seem to be
the most appropriate choice. It was felt that the
technique of roll-over credits should be avoided.
However, it was noted that the maturities and other
characteristics of loans will depend largely on
prevailing market conditions at the time of issue.
(c) The decision to issue an external loan would be taken
at the initiative of any Member State in need of
assistance to meet a balance of payments deficit
caused chiefly by the rise in oil prices. The greatest
discretion should be maintained with regard to the
entire negotiating procedure in respect of each
operation in order to avoid disturbances in financial
markets.
(d) The Council shall maintain control over the timing
and conditions of each loan operation.
III. CHOICE OF BORROWER
The various alternatives with regard to the choice of
borrower were again considered. A general consensus was
established on the following:
1. The Community should be the borrower.
2. The Council shall authorize each specific borrowing
transaction. It would also approve each on-lending
operation to the interested Member State or States and
determine the economic conditions which would be an
integral part of such a loan agreement.
3. (a) The negotiations on the terms of any borrowing
operation with the lenders will be conducted under
the auspices of the Commission, who will
recommend the final conditions to the Council
subject to the advice of the Monetary Committee
and the Committee of Governors. Whilst they
might need to be preceded by political contacts
undertaken by the Commission, these negotiations
might, in practice, be conducted at the technical
level jointly by the staff of the Commission and of
the EIB, who would report to a very limited  ad hoc
working party. This working party would be
composed of competent people nominated by the
Member States, the Commission and the EIB, and
would be responsible for preparing the operation
for approval by the Council of Ministers.
(b) The Commission shall negotiate with the borrowing
Member States and recommend the economic
conditions on which a proposed loan to a Member
State is to be granted. Such conditions shall include
the entire monitoring. system to be established
during the time-span of the loan. Subject to advice
from the Monetary Committee and the Commitee
of Governors, a Council Decision will then again
be necessary.
The Monetary Committee proposes to look into the
matter of appointing a managing agent in the near future.
IV. REPAYMENT OF LOANS
1. It is considered that only in extreme cases would a
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find it was impossible to meet a loan commitment in
foreign exchange. This applies all the more because such a
situation could only arise after three or four years
following the granting of a loan, during which time
considerable monitoring of the situation would have taken
place.
2. Upon the Council agreeing to extend a loan to a
Member State through Community procedures, each
non-borrowing Member State would incur a contingent
liability in respect of such a loan. Such contingent liability
would be represented by the obligation to provide foreign
exchange to the Community to. meet one or more
maturities or interest payments should the borrowing
Member State be unable temporarily to meet its
obligations in foreign exchange.
3. It was considered that a system be provided which
would fulfil two criteria:
(a) ensure, that at any time, the servicing af the capital
and the interest payments of the external debt shall be
carried out by the Community;
(b) a ceiling in respect of each operation should be set on
the refinancing contingent liability af each Member State. 
4. The system would operate in the following way. In
the event of inability by a borrowing Member State to
meet all or some of its due foreign exchange payments:
(a) Temporary foreign exchange financing would be
provided to the Community by each of the other
Member States in the propartion which its quota in
the existing short-term monetary support system bears
to. the total quotas of thase States (1
(b) If one or more of these States should be unable (in
whole or in part) to take up their share of refinancing
owing to balance of payments difficulties and/or a
serious deterioratian in their foreign exchange reserve
pasitions then subject to consultation and
Community agreement, the remaining States would
provide temporary facilities to the Community to
caver the shortfall, again in proportion to their
respective quotas, but subject to the over-riding limit
that no member could be called upan to contribute
more than its ceiling.
(c) Should any balance still remain to be financed after
stage (b) above, Member States experiencing balance
of payments difficulties and/or a deteriaratian in their
reserve pasitions would still have to caver this balance
in prapartion to their sho~t-term monetary support
system quat as (see 5 (f) below).
(d) The ceiling for each Member State financing
contingent liability would be twice the praportion of
its quota in the short-term monetary support system
expressed in percentages.
) Proportions of quotas of Member Countries in the short-term
monetary support system:
Germany 22'02 %,
United Kingdom 22.02 %, France 22'02 %, Italy 14-68 %,
Belgium/Luxembourg 7'34%,
Netherlands 7.34 %, Denmark 3,30 % Ireland 1.28 %.
(e) It shauld in any case be the general rule that both in
the case of original inability to pay by the borrower
as well as of temporary exemptions from financing by 
other Member States all possible external and
Community financing arrangements should first be
exhausted.
5. The monitoring system should be geared to the
pattern of each operation. It is, however, understood that
the final rule shall be that the monitoring system during
the whole period of the loan will be concerned entirely
with verifying the respect by the borrowing Member State
af the economic policy conditions which are an integral
part of the loan agreement. The following system could
be envisaged:
(a) During the grace period af a loan from the Cammunity
to a Member State when only interest charges are to
be met, six-manthly monitoring of the development of
the principal ecanomic indicators balance of
payments trends, and movements in the reserve
positions of the debtor State should be carried out.
(b) As the first capital repayment then appraaches, a more
intensive monitoring system shauld be operated to
ensure that no problems arise with regard to payment
on the due date or dates.
(c) Should it appear, however, that difficulties are likely
to arise, a special examination of the debtor Member
State s position shall take place at an appropriate time
before each payment date.
(d) All monitoring under (a), (b) and (c) above will be
carried out under the authority of the Cammissian in
collaboration with the Monetary Committee and the
Committee af Gavernars.
(e) During the special examination referred to in (c)
above the debtor Member State ~will be required to
~emanstrate its inability to meet a payment (in whole
or in part). If the special examination indicates that
such inability exists, the Commissian proposes to the
Council to decide affirmatively upon a refinancing
arrangement as described in 3 above. If there are
serious doubts that such inability exists, the debtor
Member State may apply to the Council, who. will
decide after the Commission has delivered an Opinion
and the Monetary Cammittee and the Committee of
Governors have been consulted. The decision af the
Council will be taken either on a unanimous vote or
qualified majarity fallowing its own decisian.
(f) Any Member State wishing to be temporarily
exempted (in whole ar in part) from its refinancing
commitments will have to state its pasition in the
course of the same examinatian as referred to in (c)
above, and the same pracedure shall apply to. its
request as is applied to the original deb tar State
request. The criteria by which the Community bodies
will assess the case of the Member State wishing to be
temporarily exempted, in whale or in part, may be
less stringent than the criteria to be applied to the
original debtor State, taking into account, however
the extent to which other Member States' ceilings are
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(g) Should the Council agree to a refinancing procedure
as described in (e) and (f) above, then it shall be
considered that an emergency situation has arisen and
all future procedures of monitoring of the original
debtor State shall be substantially reinforced until all
normal financial relationships have been
re-established.
(h) It shall be the general rule that the earliest
reimbursement or reinstatement should take place as
soon as the relevant Member State s balance of
payments and foreign exchange reserve positions have
improved sufficiently.
V. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
1. The Monetary Committee does not consider itself
competent to pronounce on the question of whether the
Community can undertake such a borrowing operation as
described above on the basis of Article 235 of the Treaty
of Rome. Neither does it consider itself qualified to answer
all questions relating to Community budgetary and
accountancy procedures.
2. Considerable discussion has taken place on whether
formal recommendations should be made on the currency
denomination of a first loan operation. It was, however
felt that this depended on exogenous factors and was a
subject best left to the negotiating body.
At the same time it should be pointed out that the
denomination of the first loan does not imply that
subsequent loans shall be denominated in the same way
and in this context the desirability of eventually reaching
a Community denomination should be kept in mind.
3. The Monetary Committee believes that borrowing
operations by the Community, provided they are not of
excessive size, should be realizable. It feels that apart from
the engagement of the Community, what would be
required would be public statements to the effect that the
Council had reached such a decision unanimously and that
arrangements had been made internally within the
Community to take care of all payment contingencies.
ANNEX  III
STATEMENT OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MONETARY COMMITTEE TO THE
COMMITTEE OF TWENTY
I have been asked to report on an informal discussion 
and I emphasize the word  informal  discussion  which
the Ministers of Finance of the EEC have held on April 22
and 23 at Zeist on the subject of gold.
Before I report to you on the outcome of the discussion I
would like to make clear that it has resulted neither in a
formal decision on the part of the EEC countries nor even
in a firm proposal to be made in a wider international
context. What came out of Zeist was a consensus on
certain substantive propositions that are to be further
explored before they are submitted to one of the coming
meetings of the Council of Ministers of the EEc. If at a
later stage the Council reaches agreement on a certain
position, the further procedure could be that the European
Community formulates a formal  proposal  on how to deal
with the problem of gold in the period before the reform
of the international monetary system.
In Zeist Ministers have agreed on two general
propositions. First, they have re-asserted that the SDR
should become the principal reserve asset in the future
system, and that arrangements for gold in the interim
period should not be inconsistent with that goal. Second
they have agreed that such interim arrangements should
enable monetary authorities to effectively utilize the
monetary gold stocks as instruments of international
settlement.
There was a consensus among Ministers that an increase
of the official gold price, although it might serve the
second objective, would be inconsistent with the first. In
order to mobilize monetary gold as an international
reserve asset, they have agreed that: 
1. Monetary authorities should be permitted to buy and
to sell gold among themselves at a market related
price and to sell and buy on the free market. The
monetary authorities would have complete freedom to
buy or to sell gold, and would have no obligation
whatever to enter into any particular transaction.
2. Certain delegations are of the opinion that gold
transactions with the free market should not, over a
certain period of time, lead to a net increase of the
combined official gold stocks.
3. In order to apply these principles, various practical
solutions can be envisaged. Two were mentioned in
particular. One is that monetary authorities periodically
fix a minimum and a maximum price beyond which
they would not respectively sell or buy on the market.
The other consists in creating a buffer stock to be
managed by an agent who would be charged by the
monetary authorities to sell or buy on the market such
as to ensure orderly conditions on the free market for
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4. These arrangements would be adopted provisionally
and would be reviewed in the light of experience
attained after, say, a year.
In concluding, Mr Chairman, I would like to emphasize
once more that what I have just said is not a proposal by
the EEC, but a report on an interim-stage in the
discussions. Ministers have permitted us to make this
report in order to inform you as early as possible of the
direction in which a consensus among the EEC countries
is emerging. They expect deputies to interpret the status
of the information in the light of what I have just said.
ANNEX IV
PRELIMINARY DRAFT REPORT OF THE WORKING PARTY ON SECURITIES
MARKETS
General survey
During the greatest part of the year all capital markets
national and international, were affected by important
upheavals in international capital movements as a result
of the oil price increase: rates of inflation which reached
levels never before recorded in peacetime, huge balance of
payments surpluses accruing to the oil-producing
countries, and equivalent deficits incurred by the
oil-consuming countries. The immediate consequences on
the capital markets was a rapid and continuous rise in
interest rates, particularly short-term rates, which often
exceeded those on long-term bonds, over the first 10
months of the year.
In these circumstances, there was a shortage of capital
flowing to the market as lenders, in the face of inflation
preferred to stay liquid, accompanied by an extreme
reluctance on the part of borrowers to issue long-term
loans at high rates of interest.
The 'abnormal' structure of interest-rates, with short-term
rates higher than long-term rates for long periods (the rate
on six-month dollars at one point rising to 14 
produced a market preference on the part of lenders for
short-term investments. This is demonstrated by the
extremely low volume of medium- and long-term bond
issues in most countries, and the similarly large volume of
Euro-currency bank loans (roll-over credits) accorded.
further device which was resorted to by financial
operators in an attempt to revive the markets was the use
of floating rate issues even for bond loans, based on a
previously chosen six-month average (usually the London
inter-bank rate) with a premium ('spread' ) which varied
according to the quality of the borrower and the length of
the loan. However, even with the additional safeguard of
a guaranteed minimum rate, the improvement in the
markets was not significant.
Only towards the end of the fourth quarter were there
signs of a 'normalization' on the markets, with a recovery
in the volume of bond issues and a reduction in the level
of interest rates.
The trend in interest rates was not identical in all
Member States, some countries reaching a peak earlier
than others, with an ensuing decline towards the end of
the year. In addition, the extent of the increase differed
considerably between countries, such that the interest rate
gap became even wider. In general, those countries with
the lowest increases also peaked earlier, Germany 10.9 %
in October and France 12 % in June. Countries with the
highest increases either have not yet reached a peak or
only in December (UK and Ireland over 17 % on long-
term bonds) although in these last, short-term interest rates
have remained well below long-term rates, the slope of the
yield curve being at times unusually steep.
The volume of issues varied considerably between
countries. In most, there was a reduction in the amount
raised. In France, Italy and the UK the reduction was
quite serious. In others, despite a fall in the first nine
months, the fourth quarter result was sufficient to provide
a small increase over 1973 (Denmark).
The share markets in all countries were affected by the
prevailing economic situation and the general uncertainty.
In all countries there was a fall in the share index during
the year, but the extent of the fall and the degree of
recovery towards the end of the year differed
considerably. In Germany the fall in the share price index
was least over the year as a whole, it having recovered in
the fourth quarter to rise almost back to its end-December
1973 level. There were also three countries which
experienced a rise in the index during the first part of the
year. In Germany and the Netherlands this was due to a
premature belief that the initial effects of the oil crisis were
over and the recession would not be so serious. When it
became clear that the world economic situation was in
fact worsening, then the index underwent the downturn
to the third quarter. In Italy, the rise in the index in the
first quarter (up 16 points between January and April)
was due to a belief that the purchase of equities was a
hedge against inflation. When subsequent events proved
otherwise, the index underwent a substantial fall over the
rest of the year. In the UK, Ireland and Belgium, the trend
was a continuous downward one. In France the fall was
continuous, but a certain recovery was noted during the
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National markets
In  Germany,  the markets were very depressed in the first
three quarters, but after the Bundesbank taok measures in
October easing the restrictive credit palicy, the situation
improved considerably with the expectatian by investars
that there would be a fall in interest rates. The distinctive
change from the previous year has been the general
reluctance of private households to invest in lang-term
bonds as a result of growi1.1g economic uncertainty, and
thus cancentrating activity on the band market in the
hands of the banks. Anather feature has been the
shortening of the maturities af new issues (five to seven
years) .
In the first quarter there was a lack af activity cambined
with a fall in prices and a rise in yields. This was
accompanied by a strong tendency on the part of the
public ' to acquire shart-term liquid assets rather than
long-term paper. This market situation did nat change
fundamentally in the fallawing manths. Fallawing the
measures ta ease liquidity at the end of October, the
markets recovered strongly in the faurth quarter, and the
final valume of net issues far the year 1974 as a whale at
OM 26700 millian carrespanded appraximately to the
valume in 1973 at OM 26800 million.
At the beginning af the second quarter, the Bundesbank
carried out interventians ta restrain the rise in interest
rates, since a further rise was cansidered unacceptable far
ecanamic reasans, but band yields on the secondary
market increased further to reach 10.9 % in June, and
then stabilized at around this level until October. The
measures announced by the Bundesbank on 24 October
ushered in a periad af falling yields which ended the year
at 9,4 %.
The volume af fareign DM issues was very low during the
first half of the year, as the differential between yields an
these bonds and yields on damestic bands narrowed, and
during May and June, even reversed. During the secand
half af the year, the market gathered mamentum fallawing
a widening af yield differentials, and althaugh the gap
narrowed again during the third quarter, there was 
strong recovery in the fourth quarter with issues of DM
643 millian and the yield at abaut 1  above that on
damestic bonds. The total volume af issues was about
ane-quarter that af the previaus year with DM 637
millian compared with DM 2571 millian in 1973.
The share markets also had an unsatisfactory year
althaugh the extent af the fall was less than that af other
centres. The share price index fell from 127 in January to
106 at the beginning of October, its lawest level since
Octaber 1967, but tawards the end of the year the mood
became mare confident and the index was almost back to
its level af a year earlier. The valume af share issues (at
market prices) was virtually identical to that achieved in
1973.
In  France far the majar part af the year, results were
generally unsatisfactary, due to some very bad results far
the year as a whale, and to a camplete interruptian for
five weeks during July and August. The total valume af
gross issues was about one-third down an that of 1973 at
FF 22550 million compared with FF 34 640 million the
previous year. Far the first three quarters in particular
results were sharply belaw those for the previous year.
On the side of the issuers, the market was characterized
by an almost total absence of public enterprises in the first
three quarters, and af financial institutions in the second
and third quarters, who, in view af canditions an the
damestic markets, preferred ta have recourse to the
international markets. They were encouraged in this by
the autharities principally because of the weakness of the
damestic market and secondarily far balance of payments
reasans. This absence was ta the benefit of private
enterprises who thus accounted for a majar part of
activity during this period, and achieved a total volume of
FF 8 170 millian for the year as a whole. The recovery of
activity in the fourth quarter allowed the reappearance of
the financial institutions and public enterprises on the
damestic bond market.
The mavement of yields also reflected the trends on the
bond market, as well as thase on the international
markets. Fram the beginning of the year until June yields
rose rapidly fram 9.4 ta 11.3 for public issuers (far private
issuers rates were abaut 0-5 % higher). During the third
quarter they were stable at araund 11,5, with a slight but
regular fall from the end af the quarter on until the
reappearance af minor tensions during the fourth quarter.
At the end of the year, the gross yield rates on the
secondary market were 11.21 for public securities and 11.9
far private sectar securities, compared with 10.21 and
10.47 respectively at the beginning of the year. Nominal
rates fallawed the trends an the secandary market, ending
the year at 11.3 % (public sector) and 12 % (private
sectar), a rise of 1.9 and 2.4 points respectively.
, Share issues were slightly up on 1973 in volume, despite a
very law level of activity in the third quarter. This was
compensated far by a reasonable level of issues in the
secand quarter (in contrast to a rather low volume of
band issues in that quarter) and by a substantial recovery
in the fourth quarter, in line with mast other centres. The
share price index reflects the extent to which the Paris
Baurse shared the warld-wide slump in stock market
activity, declining by about 40 points between January
and September, but recovering slightly to end the year
abaut 30 paints down at 59 from 92.
Develapments on the  Italian  bond market have been
heavily influenced by the tax reforms which came into
force an 1 January, by a restrictive credit policy and by
the trend af inflatian. Public demand far bands was
extremely weak throughout the year. The acceleration of
inflatian, the expectation of higher interest rates, and the
appearance of a gap between short-term and long-term
rates have all provided incentives to investars ta prefer
more liquid farms af investments. There were very few
new issues in the first three quarters af the year, and the
total net valume, at Lit 5 173 000 millian was abaut 50 %
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achieved only because a large number of issues were made
in the last quarter (Lit 4525000 million). Recourse to the
international markets, at Lit 1 855 000 million, almost
reached the 1973 level of Lit 1 900 000 million, despite
being concentrated in the first half of the year. The sharp
fall in the volume of domestic issues which occurred in
the first quarter was almost totally due to a concentration
of issues in the last quarter of 1973 in order to avoid
increased tax burdens for bonds issued after 1 January
1974 following the fiscal reforms which came into effect
on that date. The markets continued to function at a very
low level although measures were taken to attract private
capital to the market, such as variable rates, shortening of
maturities and premature redemption clauses. Under these
conditions, almost the total amount of each loan was
taken up by the banking system, partly due to the
prolongation of measures requiring credit institutions to
invest a certain percentage of their funds in bonds.
Yields have followed a rising trend over the year, from
about 7,5 % in January and February to 11 % in June,
rising further to around 12 % in October and ending the
year at 12.7 % in December. This increase in yields
accompanied by an interest rate structure where
short-term rates have consistently been above medium-
and long-term rates has also contributed to the high
liquidity preference of the public.
The volume of share issues declined even more than the
volume of bond issues, with an amount less than
one-third that attained in 1973 (Lit 620 000 million against
Lit 1983000 million).
The share price index rose steadily until April, rising from
169 to 185, then falling to 115 at the end of the year as
uncertainties on economic developments and the profit
possibilities of firms made investors reluctant.
In the  United Kingdom uncertainty created by two
general elections and three budgets unsettled the markets
throughout the year, although there were periods during
which the markets remained quite firm.
The volume of net issues fell substantially. At the
beginning of the year, while prices dropped and yields
rose sizeable sales of medium- and long-dated
government stocks were made and  new
medium-dated treasury tap stock was issued. This situation
continued into the second quarter when substantial sales
of stock were again made and a new long-dated and a
new short-dated tap stock were issued, despite an easing
of the market during May and June. During the third
quarter, the markets fluctuated under the influence of
various economic developments and only one new stock
was issued, although the prices of all gilt-edged stocks
rose over the period as a whole. The market was firm
throughout September, but thereafter turned very weak
the general election in October and the budget 
November doing little to disperse the feeling of
uncertainty, and although there was a slight recovery at
the end of November, demand for stocks remained low.
The trend of yields over the year as a whole was in the
upward direction, along with that of most interest rates.
Yields on long-dated government stocks began the year at
around 13 %, rose to around 14 % in March and up to
16 % in October, ending the year at over 17 %, although
short-term yields remained in the range 12 to 13 %.
The interest rate structure was 'normal' with short- term
rates lower than long-term rates throughout the whole
year.
The equities market had a very bad year, the share price
index falling continuously until 11 December when it
reached 150,4, its lowest level for. 20 years. At the end of
the year it stood at 161'4, a fall of 70 % from its May
1972 'high' of 543,6 and a fall of 51  during 1974
compared with a fall of 33 % in 1973.
Activity was extremely depressed throughout the year
particularly in the first three quarters, although the final
volume of new issues, at f,136 million was not seriously
down on the result for 1973  (E162  million). This
relatively favourable result is due to the fact that one issue
made in the fourth quarter accounts for nearly half the
total.
Events on the  Irish  capital market closely followed those
on the UK capital markets.
Demand for Irish Government stocks was fairly strong
and steady throughout the year, and new tranches of
existing stocks at various maturities were issued in every
quarter. These general trends, however sizeable, mask
fluctuations in actual sales of stock over the year. The
first quarter began well, but became weak later as prices
of long-dated stock fell, and the net result for the whole
quarter was well down on the same quarter the previous
year. The market remained fairly steady throughout the
second, quarter, prices then falling slightly in July and
August from the end-June levels to produce very buoyant
sales for these months. This trend did not, however
continue, and for the rest of the year prices of medium-
and long-dated stocks fell continuously, under the influence
of apprehensions over the future trend of interest rates
which had risen sharply to 15.25 % in October, to 17 % in
November (for long-dated stocks). This trend eased off in
December, and new tranches 'bf stock were issued to meet
the re-appearing demand for stock.
Yield rates and interest rates closely followed those in the
, the trend over the year being in the upward direction.
At the beginning of the year long-term interest rates were
still rising from the levels of the previous year, and in
March yields ranged from 12.5 to 14 %. During the
second quarter, the spread widened, however, yields on
short- and medium- dated stocks falling, while those on
long-dated stocks rose to give a range of 12 to 14,5 % at
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when long-term interest rates Climbed even higher with
yields between 12 and 15.5 % in October, rising to
between 13 and 17 % at the end of the year.
Since the Irish and UK stock exchanges are now merged,
trends follow a similar pattern, and as in the UK, the
share price index fell continuously during the year from
234 to 119.
In the  Netherlands capital markets have produced a
distinctly better performance in terms, of total borrowing
than in 1973: FI 3715 million against FI 1938 million for
public issues. The net amount of privately placed loans
increased from FI ll 100 million in 1973 to FI 12500
million in 1974. Details on gross flows are not available;
the Bank voor Nederlandsche Gemeenten placed loans
with a maturity of five years and more to a total amount
of FI 3 160 million (1973: FI 2515 million).
Demand for capital has been quite buoyant throughout
the period, particularly from public institutions, and from
non-banking concerns in the private sector. Issues were
not always easy to place, however, and to meet the
distinct preference on the part of household investors for
short-term bonds the maturities of bond issues had to be
shortened. The private placement of 25 year bonds
became quite difficult, even with successive increases in
interest rates. However, there was a marked recovery
during the fourth quarter caused by expectations that
long-term rates had reached their peak. This manifested
itself in very active markets ror both public issues and
privately placed bonds.
In accordance with international interest rate trends and
persisting inflation, long term interest rates continued to
rise over the first seven months of the year, thus
continuing the trend which had already manifested itself
in the latter months of 1973. In the early period this was
reinforced by the reluctance of institutional investors to
invest at prevailing rates on a long-term basis, and by
large demand for capital, particularly from public
authorities. By April they had risen to over 10 %, then to
11'5 % for 25-year loans in July, with yields on the
secondary market following suit, rising from 9.01 in
December 1973 to reach a high of about 10.4 in August.
Therea~ter, there was an easing of rates and towards the
end of the year the decline in rates gathered momentum
with yields down to 9.1 % in December (a fall of 1.3
~oints).
The increase in the gap observed in the first quarters
between yields on private placements and yields on bonds
as a result of growing interest from foreigners in guilder
bonds was followed in the last months by a reduction in
this gap, with rates on private placements falling by about
1.6 %.
With effect from  February, the closed bond (or
guilder) circuit was abolished, and after the second
quarter there was great demand from foreigners for
guilder investments in the form of fixed interest guilder
bonds as well as in short-term guilder notes. After having
come to a virtual standstill in the first quarter, issue
activity resumed in the second and I third quarters with
about FI 300 million in each quarter, increasing to FI 400
million in the fourth quarter.
The share market, traditionally unimportant as a source
of funds, also produced a lower result than in 1973, and
the share price index fell from 108 to 88 over the period.
In  Denmark as a result of the dominating role of tap
issues by the mortgage credit institutions in the bond
market, trends in this market are reflected by the
movement of prices and yields on the secondary market
following changes in the demand for and the supply of
capital, especially for construction purposes.
Over the year as a whole, the volume of issues stabilized
at the high ' level attained after the considerable year on
year increases from 1970 to 1973. The total of gross issues
was only slightly higher than in 1973.
In the first half of the year, however, the bond markets
were under heavy pressure: accelerating inflation, tight
liquidity in the banking system and the economy as a
result of the restrictive credit policy pursued by the
monetary authorities all combined to produce a fall 
bond prices despite considerable purchases by the national
bank. The average yield of all bonds in circulation rose
from 14 % in January to 15.3 % in March and to 
all-time high of 17.7 % at the beginning of August.
At the end of August, however, there was a sharp reversal
of the market situation with a decline in rates both on
long-term bonds and' in the money market, reflecting a
drop in new housing starts, as well as an improvement in
the liquidity position of the banks, who recommenced
purchasing after having been net sellers of bonds in the
second quarter and the national bank became a net seller
again. By the end of September, yields had fallen to below
16 %. Prices continued to rise over the fourth quarter and
by the end of the period yields had fallen to 14.5 %.
Foreign purchases of Danish kroner bonds, regulated by a
quota system, were modest during the year, and during
the first nine months sales only slightly exceeded
repatriations. As from 1 December, foreign purchases of
Danish bonds were completely liberalized.
The volume of share issues was modest throughout the
year. The share price index exhibited a downward trend
to November, from 188 to 133, but recovered slightly in
December to 147.
Placing of issues on the  Belgian  capital markets was
slightly more difficult in 1974 than in 1973, particularly in
the second and third quarters, although the total volume
of gross issues reached FB 273 000 million compared with
FB 267 000 million the year before. But there was a
reduction in the net volume of issues (FB 134 000 million
against FB 143000 million in 1973), which can be
explained by a considerable increase in the amounts
devoted by the State to contractual amortizations and to
both final and intermediate redemptions, the net volume
of tap issues being, however, distinctly higher.No C 174/24 Official Journal of the European Communities 31. 7. 
During the first half of the year, the State had recourse to
the market on two occasions. Although the placing of the
February loan was fairly easy, the loan in May did not
rove the same success. However, after an improvement in
the terms of loans and an increase in the interest rate to
10 % (1 % over that of the May loan) for a loan in
September, which was placed very easily, the market was
more receptive in the fourth quart~r.
Over the first eight months of the year, interest rates rose
continuously, but in September there was  certain
stabilization which continued to the end of the year.
Secondary market yields for public issues which had
begun the year at 7.92 rose to 9.26 in September, but
declined again to 9 in December, while those on
private issues rose from 8.5 to 11,9 in October, declining
to 11 in December. Nominal rates on public issues
reached a maximum of 10 % in September and remained
there until the end of the year.
The share market had a reasonably successful year, the
total volume of new issues in the first nine months being
higher than that recorded in 1973, but activity was low 
the fourth quarter, so that the total for the year as a
whole was lower than in both 1972 and 1973.
The share price index followed the same trend as in most
countries, falling by 35 points over the year, from 164 at
end-December 1973 to 129 at end-December 1974.
In view of the large margin between money market
interest rates and long-term interest rates the
Luxembourg  authorities decided not to permit any issues
on to the calendar during the first nine months of the
year, neither domestic issues, nor conventional foreign
Issues.
In August, the banks increased their terms for medium- (
and long-term placings, which was followed by a fall 
money market rates, and brought an end to this period of
tight money. As a result, the authorities admitted a 'test
issue by the ECSC, in October. This was followed by a
slightly larger EIB loan in November and a Council of
Europe loan in December, to produce a total volume of
issues of Lfrs 1100 million compared with Lfrs 2700
million in 1973.
Although this low amount was easily absorbed by the
market, the authorities insisted that the initially decided
ceilings be strictly observed in order to leave disposable
capital free to reactivate the secondary market.
Yields on the secondary market remained fairly stable
over the year, reaching a high point at the end of the
third quarter, and declining thereafter.
International bond markets
Major changes in world financial flows and in the balance
of payments of most trading countries as a result of the
oil price rise and the consequent surpluses of the oil
producing countries as well as deficits for most oil
importing countries seriously affected the  international
bond markets  during the period.
Over the first nine months of the year, investors showed
a marked tendency to prefer short-term liquid investments.
This is apparent from the large amount of roll-over
credits accorded to the detriment of conventional bond
issues. In fact, the volume of roll-over credits (syndicated
bank loans in Euro-currencies) accorded is inversely
related to the volume of bond issues. During the first two
quarters of the year, the ratio of roll-over credits to bond
issues was 17 and 26 respectively. In the third quarter this
had fallen to 15 and in the fourth quarter, as the bond
market recovered, the amount of roll-over credits was
only three times that of bond issues. The total amount
was about $30 000 million, an increase of 30  over
1973, but compared with a 400  increase in 1973 over
1972.
The general malaise on the bond markets: low volume of
issues, increasing interest rates, and shorter maturities can
be largely attributed to continued monetary instability,
investors being reluctant to invest in long-term bonds at a
time when yields on long-term bonds compared
unfavourably with rates of inflation. An additional factor
however, must be the marked liquidity preference on the
part of investors from the oil-producing countries
combined with the delay between the capital being
received by the oil-producing countries and their recycling
it back to the bond markets, in the place of' industrialized
countries which had previously been the major source of
funds. The significant improvement which occurred in the
fourth quarter can be largely attributed to the fact that
voluntary recycling of capital via the private long-term
bond market was getting under way, combined with the
policy of lower interest rates being pursued by the
authorities on the national markets to encourage demand.
The volume of issues fell appreciably over the first three
quarters of the year. From 1 204 million EUR in the last
quarter of 1973, it dropped to 504 million EUR in the first
quarter, and to a lO-year low of 249 million EUR in the
third quarter as a result of the factors decribed above. In
the fourth quarter there was a strong recovery to 1 169
million EUR as conditions improved to produce a total 
2300 million EUR, which while not as low as had been
expected was still barely half the volume recorded in
1973. The decline affected all the currencies of issue
except the guilder and the unit of account.
A breakdown by currencies of issue shows an increase in
the percentages for the dollar (53 from 46 % of total
volume), the guilder and the unit of account (12 from 4 %
and 9 from 3 % respectively) to the detriment of the
others. In contrast to the previous year was the decline in
Swiss francs (down from 15 to 11 %) and in DM (25 to
10 %). During the second quarter of the year, issues in
DM virtually disappeared.
Issues in units of account and 'EURCO' increased
considerably, but issues in EURCO were not particularly31. 7.  Official Journal of the European Communities No C  174/25
successful. This .was attributed to the fact that this
formula may be too complex for most investors to
understand.
There were some changes in the pattern of debtor
countries over the past year. The EEC share remained the
same, but within it some substantial shifts took place. Far
fewer UK borrowers floated loans, but more French and
Dutch borrowers came into the markets. The share of 
and non-EEC international organizations decreased, but
that of the rest of the world went up.
Interest rates on the international capital markets were
seriously affected by events on the money markets and the
changes in financial flows. An increasing tendency this
year was for loans to carry a variable rate, based on the
LIBOR (London Inter-Bank Offer Rate) and an additional
spread' the rate of which v aries according to the length of
the loan and the quality of the borrower. This last was an
attempt to overcome the uncertainty and lack of
confidence prevailing in the market.
Interest rates on dollar issues as measured by yields on the
secondary market reflected both the degree of
international confidence in the dollar, internal. political
events in the US and the ability of the US to deal with the
financial implications of the energy crisis, as well as
international trends. Beginning the year at around 8.5 %,
by June they had risen to 10 % and reached a high of
12 % in October. Thereafter, in line with the recovery on
the markets, interest rates on dollar issues fell slightly to
11.25 % at the end of the year.
With the exception of the period May to June, yields on
DM international bond issues were continually above
those of internal issues. Despite this yield gap, demand for
DM internadonal issues was weak until the autumn.
However, towards the end of 1974 the volume of 
foreign issues increased sharply which can be explained
partly by the return of confidence following the success of
the stabilization policy pursued by the German
authorities, and partly by the change in the behaviour of
investors from oil-producing countries who began to
undertake longer term investments and at the same time
choosing to diversify the range of currencies in which they
invest. Furthermore, it seems that issuers do not expect a
significant revaluation of the DM in relation to their own
currencies during the life of these loans. 
The market for international bonds denominated in Swiss
francs, where interest rates are traditionally at a low level
by comparison with other currencies ofissue, was seriously
affected this year. At 6.5 % at the end of 1973, the level
of yields had risen to around 8.5 to 9 % at the end of the
second quarter. Despite a closing of the markets by the
Swiss authorities, it was eventually admitted that the
pressure on rates was too great, and the markets were
re-opened with rates for new issues- at 8 % in July and
then drifting upwards to end the year at 8.25 to 8.75 %.
Some changes occurred in the bond market policies
pursued by the member countries. In Germany, sales to
non-residents of domestic bonds with more than four
years maturity were authorized again at the end of
January. In September, the cash deposit requirement for
credits taken up abroad by residents was finally lifted,
although its rate had already been lowered. In the
Netherlands, in accordance with arrangements with other
snake' countries to relax restrictions on capital inflows,
the ' guilder circuit was abolished in March. A new law
affecting the control of the stock exchanges and of stock
issuing companies was introduced in Italy in June.
The Working Party continued its examination of the
problems involved in protecting the holders of fixed
interest securities from loss in real value and has discussed
several aspects of the problem in detail, particularly the
experiences of individual Member States in applying such
measures.
With regard to the problem of coordination and
integration of capital markets, the Committee exchanged
regular information on developments in Member States,
and has begun its analysis of the obstacles which currently
exist to the free movement of bonds and other securities.
To this end, it has commenced work on the revision and
up-dating of its 1970 report on 'bond market policy in the
Member States of the EEC', to include the three new
Member States. The Working Party completed its studies
of capital market structures this year when two meetings
were devoted primarily to an examination of the Irish and
. Danish capital markets respectively.No C 174/26 Official Journal of the European Communities 31. 7. 
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ANNEX 
INTERIM REPORT BY THE WORKING PARTY ON SHORT-TERM
CAPITAL MOVEMENTS
Since 9 October 1973, when it submitted its first report 
the Monetary Committee, the Working Party has held
three meetings. Pursuant to the new instructions received
from the Committee on 16 April 1974, the Working Party
gave priority, in the first stage, to collecting information
on restrictions on capital movements adopted by Member
States. In the experts' opinion , this emphasis was justified
by the fact that in the period under review (October 1973
to end-December 1974) profound changes took place in
international economic and monetary relations, some of
Introduction
which will have long-term effects that are difficult 
judge.
Chapter I discusses the most significant factors behind the
changes in the volume and direction of capital
movements, and behind the measures taken by Member
States; it also includes a summary of modifications
introduced iJ'l the method of the various instruments.
Chapter II describes the measures adopted by the
authorities in each individual country.
CHAPTER I
The most significant factors affecting capital movements and their control  changes in the
method of application of the instruments
A.  Events leading to the Member States modifying their
capital movement restrictions
In the period under review, profound changes took place
in international economic and monetary relations, causing
Member States to modify their capital movement
restrictions.
The following factors are worth noting:
the dollar was firm until September 1974, which was
due partly to the fact that oil payments are generally
made in dollars, and partly to the restrictive monetary
policy followed by the United States during the
majority of the period. Since then, the easing of
American monetary policy and the small flow of
petro-dollars into the American banking system during
the last quarter of 1974 exerted downward pressure on
, the dollar;
all Member States were expecting a sharp
deterioration in their current accounts either in the
form of reduced surpluses or in the form of an
increased deficit with the deterioration mainly
attributable to the rise in the prices of imported
primary products, particularly oil;
in the majority of Member States, the authorities
initially pursued restrictive monetary policies which
resulted in an increase in short-term interest rates. As a
result, interest rate differentials between the various
international markets were considerably reduced. From
Autumn 1974 on, in most Member States monetary
policy was eased gently; due to  considerable
parallelism between the national measures, interest rate
differentials between the countries did not increase;
despite the fact that virtually all currencies were
floating, there were substantial official interventions on
foreign exchange markets to maintain exchange rates
at acceptable levels;
the countries which experienced sharp deteriorations
in their current account position used foreign currency
borrowing primarily to maintain the level of their
official reserves.
These factors brought about profound changes in the
volume and direction of short-term capital movements:
at the beginning of 1974 the pattern of speculative
capital flows changed as a result of the recovery of the
dollar in relation to European currencies; however, the
later reversal of the trend in the dollar reinforced the
attraction of investments in European currencies;
the volume of capital flows induced by interest rate
differentials declined, as a result of the converging
trends of short-term interest rates on the money
markets in Europe and the United States, and also of
credit restrictions;
floating currencies made foreign exchange speculation
more dangerous than under the system of fixed
exchange rates.31. 7. 75 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 174/29
B.  Changes in the ob;ectives of the measures taken
As a result of the factors described above, restrictions on
capital movements in most Member States lost some
significance. With the direction of short-term capital flows
reversed at the beginning of the period under review
many restrictions on capital inflows no longer served any
essential purpose. Furthermore, the almost universal
adoption of floating exchange rates together with
concerted interventions by central banks in Europe and
the United States, made it possible to absorb without
serious difficulty such disruptive capital movements as
continued to occur.
C.  The changes seen from a Community point of view
The measures taken by Member States, although varying
in scope, were in the same direction: easing of restrictions
on capital inflows, and/or tightening of restrictions on
capital outflows.
Because of this, there was even some degree of 'harmoni-
zation , without eliminating the differences between the
policies followed by Member States: while some became
more liberal and eased restrictions on capital inflows,
others became more 'interventionist' and tightened restric-
tions on capital outflows.
The changes in restrictions on capital movements of
Member States did not lead to any distinction being made
between movements originating inside the Community
and movements from outside; further considerable
divergences still existed as regards ~he instruments
employed.
In the table below an 'X' in the  appropriate column
indicates the Member States which during the period
under review eased restrictions on capital inflows and/or
introduced or tightened restrictions on capital outflows.
Country
Restrictions on Restrictions on
capital inflows capital outflows
eased tightened
Germany
Belgium
Denmark
France
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
United Kingdom
D.  The principal instruments introduced, abolished 
modified
(a)  Two-tier foreign exchange markets
The two-tier market was abolished in both France and
Italy. In  France  this move was made in order to enable
the supply of borrowed foreign exchange to balance
importers' demand  for foreign exchange on a unified
market. Maintenance of the two-tier market would have
meant a weak official and a strong financial franc, thus
discouraging capital inflows.
In  Italy,  the system was abolished partly because of its
complexity and partly because of the insignificant volume
of transactions on the free market since the introduction
of the requirements on residents to lodge an interest-free
deposit equivalent to 50  of the value of foreign
inve~tments, and since the decision that all commercial
loans had to be obtained through the regulated market.
(b)  Limited split of the foreign exchange markets
In the  Netherlands,  the 'closed circuit' system was
abolished #ter the authorities noted a decline in the
preference of non-residents for fixed-interest paper
denominated in guilders.
In the  United Kingdom,  rules on the compulsory use of
either the investment currency market or the official
market were modified in order to channel certain foreign
exchange inflows into the official market.
In  Ireland,  analagous modifications were implemented in
view of the free movement of capital which exists
between the United Kingdom and this country.
c)  Regulations governing non-residents' deposits
the negative interest rates on non-residents' convertible
franc deposits were suspended in Belgium and
Luxembourg; then abolished in Belgium;
the ban on the payment of interest on non-residents
sight deposits in national currency was suspended in
France; in Belgium and in Luxembourg where it was
limited to convertible accounts, it was suspended, then
abolished;
the ban on the building-up, by non-residents, of time
deposits in convertible accounts and on the payment
of interest on all convertible accounts was suspended
and later abolished in Belgium and Luxembourg.
(d)  Regulations governing residents' foreign borrowing
not linked to commercial transactions
In  Germany,  authorization was no longer required for
foreign loans contracted by residents after 1 February
1974, and for the transfer of claims on residents to
non-residents after 15 September 1974. The 'Bardepot
was abolished with effect from 1 October 1974.No C 174/30 Official Journal of the European Communities 31. 7. 
In  France,  the ceiling for foreign currency borrowing
abroad by residents was considerably raised.
In the  Netherlands,  the rules on loans between affiliated
companies were eased.
In  Denmark the rules on long-term loans raised abroad
the proceeds from which are used in Denmark, were
modified.
(e)  Regulations governing the external positions of
commercial banks
In  Belgium,  ceilings on the banks' debit positions were
relaxed, but ceilings on credit positions introduced.
In  Italy,  banks cannot have a net external debit position
greater than that as at the evening of 19 July 1974.
(f)  Fixing of special compulsory reserve ratios on banks
liabilities to non-residents
The compulsory mInimUm reserves against banks
outstanding short-term liabilities in national currency were
abolished in France. In Belgium and Luxembourg an
identical measure was taken for the sector covered by the
regulations.
Compulsory minimum reserves against changes in banks
oustanding short-term liabilities  in  national currency (in
the sector covered by the regulations) were removed in
Belgium and Luxembourg.
In Germany, compulsory reserves against the increase
in banks liabilities to non-residents were abolished with
effect from 1 January 1974.
(g) 
Regulations governing leads and lags
Provisions concerning time limits for payment for imports
and exports were amended in several countries to make
inflows of capital easier (Belgium and Luxembourg), or
make outflows more difficult (France). In Germany, with
the lifting of the 'Bardepot , these rules no longer served
any purpose.
(h)  Purchase of national securities by non-residents
Restrictions were removed in  Germany,  except for fixed
interest securities maturing in less than four years.
In  Denmark non-residents were authorized to purchase
fixed interest Danish bonds which are denominated in
Danish kroner and dealt with on stock exchanges.
(i)  Interest-free deposits on certain imports
Deposits of this kind were introduced in Italy, the
principal objective being to reduce the liquidity in the
economy.
(j) 
Restrictions on foreign spending by residents
Restrictions of this kind were introduced by Italy to curb
exports of capital.
(k)  Restrictions on exports of capital for direct investment
abroad
In March 1974, the United Kingdom authorities withdrew
a previous relaxation of the controls on exports for direct
investment by United Kingdom residents in other
countries of the EEc.
(1)  Limitation of forward currency purchase
In France, the possibilities for residents to engage in
forward currency purchase were considerably reduced.
(m)  Prohibition on lending to non-residents
In France the authorities introduced a measure
prohibiting the granting of loans in FF to non-residents.
CHAPTER II
The major modifications to restrictions on capital movements in Member States
In this chapter, a summary  is  given of the major changes,
specifying the instruments abolished or newly introduced
and the related objectives.
1. Germany
Most restrictions on capital inflows were progressively
lifted. Th~ renewed strength of the dollar, together
with the tendency for interest rate levels to converge
reduced the danger of capital inflows triggered by
speculative considerations or by interest rate
differentials. Furthermore, with the cost of imported
products going up, it was thought desirable to allow
the DM to appreciate in order to minimize the effects
on domestic price levels. There were also outflows of
capital, which were, however, followed by inflows of
capital at the end of the year.
Since the abolition of the cash deposit requirement (in
October 1974), the only remaining restrictions concern
payment of interest on non-residents' deposits and the
purchase by non-residents of money market paper and
securities with a remaining life of less than four years.
Minimum reserves against the increase  in  the banks
liabilities to non-residents were abolished. On the other31. 7.  Official J~urnal of the European Communities No C 174/31
hand, the compulsory reserves agai~st total outstanding
liabilities are still applicable. This ratio, incidentally, is
still fixed at a higher level than that applying to
residents' deposits
2. Belgium
In view of the oil crisis and the expected balance of
payments deficit, restrictions on capital inflows were
progressively removed and rules were introduced 
the credit position of the banks.
The following provisions were suspended:
negative and zero interest rates on non-residents
convertible accounts;
compulsory reserves against the outstanding volume
of and changes in these accounts.
ceiling on banks' creditor positions in foreign
currenCIes on the regulated market was, however
introduced.
Provisions concerning time limits for commercial
payments were changed in order to lighten the controls
on advance payment for exports (leads) and deferred
payments for imports (lags). 
.. 
3. Denmark
In December 1973 the rules concerning incoming
financial credits were tightened in order to prevent
circumvention of domestic credit restrictions.
Thereafter authorization was only granted for loans
used to finance fixed investment by the borrowing
company itself.
In September 1974, primarily in order to stimulate
investment and to reduce unemployment, these rules
were eased. It  is  expected that inflows of capital will
also contribute towards financing a growing deficit of
the balance of payments.
Since 1 December 1974 non-residents have been
authorized to purchase fixed interest Danish bonds
denomil1ated in Danish kroner and dealt with on stock'
exchanges.
4. Ireland
Because of the free movement of capital between the
United Kingdom and Ireland, this latter country took
measures analagous to those introduced in the United
, Kingdom with regard to:
the proceeds from disinvestments in non-EEC
countries;
the proceeds of the sale of OVerseas sterling area
securities;
outward direct investment in the overseas sterling
area;
-- the acquisition of personal property outside the
scheduled territories.
5. France
The speculation against the franc at the end of 1973
and the beginning of 1974 led the French authorities 
following a substantial loss of foreign exchange 
temporarily suspend the application of the narrower
margins agreement. Subsequently, the rise in oil
product prices' helped to cause a deterioration of the
balance of payments, and the deficit was met by
borrowing abroad. This situation prompted the
authorities both to abolish restrictions on capital
inflows and to curb capital outflows.
The measures taken included:
abolition of the two-tier foreign exchange market;
relaxation of the restrictions applying to foreign
loans raised by residents;
suspension of:
the ban on the payment of interest on
non-residents' accounts
the obligation to maintain reserves against these
accounts;
introduction of:
restrictions on forward purchases of foreign
exchange
a ban on French franc loans to non-residents,
six-month limit on the time allowed for
payment for exports.
6. Italy
In view of the widening balance of payments deficit
the authorities gradually tightened the restrictions on
exports of capital and introduced restrictions con-
cerning payment for imports and on foreign spending
by residents.
The two-tier foreign exchange market was abolished
since it no longer served any purpose.
In detail:
restrictions were placed on the import of Italian
bank noted;
an interest-free deposit of 50 % had to be lodged in
respect of imports of certain types of goods;
restrictions were placed on expenditure by residents
travelling aJ?road.
In addition, limits were imposed on banks' net debit
positions (19 July 1974).No C 174/32 Official Journal of the European Communities 31. 7. 
7. Luxembourg
With the danger of speculative inflows of foreign
exchange receding more and more, measures
introduced earlier to curb capital inflows were
suspended:
the compulsory reserve ratio against non-residents
convertible accounts was reduced to zero;
the special commission payable on credit balances
in non-residents' convertible accounts was similarly
reduced to zero.
Modifications to the rules on the banks' credit position
in foreign currencies on the regulated market and on
leads and lags are identical to those described under
Belgium
8. Netherlands
After the revaluation of the guilder in September 1973
and after the declaration of the oil-boycott,
expectations concerning the long-term perspectives of
the balance of payments encouraged the authorities to
liberalize progressively existing restrictions on inflow of
capital. International preference for fixed-interest
guilder securities had disappeared:
authorization policy as regards incoming
intercompany financial credits with a maturity of
five years and more has been eased;
the '0' guilder circuit has been abolished.
9. United Kingdom
In view of the balance of payments situation which was
in deficit already before the increase in oil prices,
existing exchange ~ontrol policies have been tightened
in order to encourage inflows and to reduce outflows
of capital:
rules concerning borrowing abroad by residents for
domestic use have been relaxed;
financing rules for outward direct investment in the
EEC and in the overseas sterling area were brought
into line with those for the rest of the world by
precluding the use of official exchange for the most
part;
rules concerning repatriation of profits,
disinvestment proceeds from direct investments
abroad and sales by residents of foreign currency
securities have been tightened.